Break Up the Tech and Media Monopolies

Six conglomerates — Comcast, Disney, Paramount, Warner Bros. Discovery, Sony, and Fox Corporation — currently account for approximately 90 percent of U.S. media output, down from approximately fifty companies in 1983. At the time of the August 5, 2024 ruling in United States v. Google LLC, Alphabet held roughly 90 percent of the U.S. general search market by computer share and 95 percent by smartphone share. Federal antitrust authority under Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 7 of the Clayton Act has not been used to require structural divestiture of a single dominant firm since the 1984 breakup of AT&T.

Statutory authority and current enforcement posture

The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 (15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2) prohibits monopolization, attempts to monopolize, and combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade. Section 7 of the Clayton Act of 1914 (15 U.S.C. § 18) prohibits acquisitions whose effect “may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.” The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (Section 7A of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18a) requires premerger notification for transactions above statutory thresholds, set at $126.4 million for 2025. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. § 45) authorizes the FTC to address “unfair methods of competition.” The FCC’s national television audience reach cap, codified by Congress in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, allows a single broadcast group to reach 39 percent of U.S. television households. The UHF discount halves the counted reach for UHF-band stations, which permits a combined actual reach as high as 78 percent.

Active federal monopolization cases under Section 2 of the Sherman Act include United States v. Google LLC (D.D.C. 2024), in which Judge Amit Mehta ruled on August 5, 2024 that Google had monopolized the U.S. general search and text-advertising markets; United States v. Google LLC (E.D. Va. 2025), in which Judge Leonie Brinkema ruled on April 17, 2025 that Google had monopolized the publisher ad server and ad exchange markets; United States v. Apple Inc. (D.N.J. 2024), in which Judge Julien Xavier Neals denied Apple’s motion to dismiss in June 2025; and FTC v. Amazon.com (W.D. Wash. 2023), in which the merits phase is scheduled to follow a related $2.5 billion FTC consumer-protection settlement reached in September 2025. FTC v. Meta Platforms was decided for Meta by Judge James Boasberg in November 2025; the FTC has filed notice of appeal to the D.C. Circuit. The remedies phase in United States v. Google LLC (D.D.C.) was finalized on December 5, 2025. The court imposed behavioral remedies, including sharing of certain search index data and a prohibition on exclusive distribution contracts. The court declined to order divestiture of Chrome or Android, both of which the Department of Justice had requested.

The statute, executive direction, and FCC rulemaking

The package combines a statute, an executive direction, and an FCC rulemaking. The statute reintroduces and consolidates the digital-platform competition bills from the 117th Congress: the American Innovation and Choice Online Act (S. 2992 / H.R. 3816), the Platform Competition and Opportunity Act (S. 3197 / H.R. 3826), and the Ending Platform Monopolies Act (H.R. 3825). The executive direction instructs the Antitrust Division and the FTC to seek structural divestiture as the presumptive Section 2 remedy. The FCC rulemaking restores and tightens the broadcast ownership rules.

• Repeal the 39 percent national television audience reach cap codified in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004 and reduce the cap to 25 percent.
• Eliminate the UHF discount in 47 CFR § 73.3555.
• Restore the local-marketing-agreement and joint-sales-agreement attribution rules that were weakened after 2017.
• Direct the Antitrust Division and the FTC to seek structural divestiture as the presumptive remedy in successful Section 2 cases, consistent with the remedies in Standard Oil and AT&T.
• Codify a presumption that acquisitions by covered platforms — those with at least 50 million U.S. monthly active users or at least 100,000 U.S. monthly business users, owned by an entity above a designated U.S. market capitalization — are unlawful absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
• Lower Hart-Scott-Rodino size-of-transaction thresholds for covered industries, including broadcast media, online advertising, e-commerce, and operating-system distribution, and authorize ex post review of any acquisition by a covered platform that closed below threshold during the prior decade.
• Prohibit covered platforms from operating a marketplace and competing on that marketplace with merchants on it, modeled on H.R. 3825.
• Authorize structural divestiture as a remedy for systematic non-compliance, consistent with Article 18 of the EU Digital Markets Act.

Precedent

Federal precedent for structural divestiture under Section 2 of the Sherman Act includes Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), in which the Supreme Court ordered the dissolution of Standard Oil into 33 separate companies; United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), in which the Modified Final Judgment broke the Bell System into seven Regional Bell Operating Companies effective January 1, 1984; and United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), in which the District Court ordered Microsoft’s separation into operating-system and applications businesses before the D.C. Circuit vacated the divestiture remedy on remand and the Department of Justice subsequently declined to pursue it. The October 2020 House Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust majority report concluded a 16-month investigation involving more than one million documents by recommending congressional consideration of structural separation of Apple, Amazon, Facebook, and Google.

International comparators include the European Union’s Digital Markets Act, which entered into force in 2023. The European Commission designated Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, ByteDance, Meta, and Microsoft as gatekeepers in September 2023, with Booking added in May 2024. Article 18 authorizes the European Commission to impose structural remedies, including divestiture, after a finding of systematic non-compliance, defined as three violations of Articles 5, 6, or 7 within an eight-year period. Penalties for first violations reach 10 percent of global turnover and 20 percent for repeated infringements.

First 100 days

Day one. The President directs the Attorney General and the Chair of the Federal Trade Commission to pursue structural divestiture as the presumptive Section 2 remedy in the active monopolization cases, including the appeal of United States v. Google LLC (D.D.C.), the remedies phase of United States v. Google LLC (E.D. Va.), the litigation in United States v. Apple Inc., and FTC v. Amazon.com. The FCC opens a notice of proposed rulemaking to lower the national television audience reach cap to 25 percent and to eliminate the UHF discount.

Day thirty. The FTC and the Antitrust Division publish revised joint Merger Guidelines that adjust HSR thresholds downward for media, online advertising, e-commerce, and operating-system markets, and that authorize retroactive review of below-threshold acquisitions by covered platforms during the prior decade. The FCC publishes proposed rules tightening attribution of local marketing agreements and joint sales agreements among broadcast television stations.

Day ninety. The President signs an omnibus competition statute combining the American Innovation and Choice Online Act, the Platform Competition and Opportunity Act, and the Ending Platform Monopolies Act. The FCC finalizes the lowered national audience reach cap and the repeal of the UHF discount. Companion appropriations legislation increases FTC and Antitrust Division enforcement budgets and authorizes both agencies to retain civil-penalty recoveries for enforcement use, subject to congressional reporting.

Effect of the structural reforms

Federal monopolization cases against dominant digital platforms shift from behavioral conduct restrictions toward structural divestiture remedies. Below-threshold acquisitions by covered platforms become subject to retroactive review, closing the pathway through which dominant platforms have acquired smaller competitors over the prior two decades. The FCC’s national television audience reach cap is reduced from 39 percent to 25 percent, and the UHF discount is eliminated, producing a tighter local broadcast ownership ceiling than the rules in effect since the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The Hart-Scott-Rodino premerger framework is adjusted to cover lower-value transactions that have contributed to horizontal and vertical consolidation in media and digital markets.